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Abstract 
ZigBee is a specification that enhances the IEEE 802.15.4 standard by adding network and security layers and an application 
framework for high level communication in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Since ZigBee is essential in the operation of 
WSN; it is imperative to verify the correctness of its design. Formal methods can be used efficiently to verify a wide range of 
systems, including ZigBee protocol stack specification. In this paper we use Event-B formal verification method to model and 
verify ZigBee protocol stack by providing embedding of the protocol primitives in Event-B. Our approach takes advantage of the 
Event-B method capabilities to model designs at different levels of abstraction which fits the layered nature of the protocol. 
Keywords: ZigBee, Formal Verification, Event-B, First Order Logic, Theorem Proving; 
1. Introduction
WSNs has become an important research field that is rapidly growing due to the development of new
technologies in inexpensive sensors. As many interesting and diverse applications of Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs) are explored, there has become an urgent need to develop a communication and management protocol that 
is tailored for the special environment and requirements of WSN operations. ZigBee [6] is a specification that 
enhances the IEEE 802.15.4 [4] standard by adding network and security layers and an application framework, it 
provides a suite of high level communication using small, low-power digital radios for Low-Rate Wireless Sensor 
Networks. The technology defined by the ZigBee specification is intended to be simple and less expensive than 
other wireless protocols.  
Simulation based verification is widely used to verify systems. In simulation a test-bench is built to functionally 
verify the design performs to specification by providing meaningful input scenarios. However, it is infeasible to 
simulate all possible scenarios of the system under test, in addition, certain corner case scenarios are highly likely to 
be missed during simulation. Therefore, formal methods can be used in order to verify the correctness of the system 
under design, along with simulation based techniques. Formal verification [8] uses mathematical reasoning to verify 
that a design specification comprehends certain design requirements, and it has been used for the analysis, modeling 
and verification of a variety of hardware and software systems. Using formal reasoning for the development and 
analyses of a formal model for the given system will increase the chances for finding errors in the system under test. 
The usage of wireless systems in safety critical applications and their complexity are good motivations for using 
formal methods in this domain [9].  
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In this paper, we use formal verification in order to model and verify ZigBee protocol stack. We verify certain 
design requirements for the protocol stack by modeling its functional operations, and then we verify properties 
related to its specifications using the Event-B method. For the embedding of ZigBee protocol layers in Event-B [15] 
first-order logic, the protocol semantics should be well defined and understood to be semantically embedded in the 
Event-B language [12]. This embedding allows the verification of properties related to the protocol specifications 
while preserving the semantics of the protocol in the Event-B model. ZigBee is a layered protocol, therefore it can 
be modeled in Event-B at different levels of abstraction. 
2. Related work 
Formal methods have been used in the analysis and verification of similar wireless systems, for instance, in the 
PRISM model checker has been used to analyze a sub protocol of the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless local area 
networks [10]. Ballarini and Miller [1] also used the same approach to verify the Medium Access Control protocol 
SMAC. In another approach, the ETMCC model checking has been used for the analysis of a variant of the central 
access protocol of the IEEE 802.11 standard [11].  
Other work on the verification of ZigBee includes the work in [13] that uses OPNET in order to simulate the 
IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee. Fruth [7] used PRISM model checker for probabilistic verification of the IEEE 802.15.4 
networking standard. Yang et al. [14] used OMNeT++ discrete event simulation for Maritime Surveillance Sensor 
Networks(MSSNs) verification, ZigBee protocol was simulated in the data link layer. Duﬂot et al. [3] present a 
formal analysis of the discovery phase of the Bluetooth wireless communication protocol using the DTMC model. 
In [2] Chunqing and Jiancheng studied the data security protection of ZigBee technology.  
The use of probabilistic model checking is limited to systems that can only be expressed as probabilistic finite 
state machines or Markov chains. Another major limitation of the probabilistic model checking approach is state 
space explosion. The work in [9] used Higher Order Logic (HOL) theorem proving for analysis of the probabilistic 
properties in wireless systems. The method is highly interactive, while using first-order logic can reduce interaction 
with the prover. 
In our approach, we model and verify the functional behaviors of the ZigBee protocol stack considering the 
transaction level functionality of the protocol, while most of the state of the art methods focus on probabilistic and 
low level related properties. The use of Event-B provides a rich expressive modeling language, and on the other 
hand, it is less interactive, compared to HOL theorem proving approach. 
3. Verification Methodology 
In order to embed the protocol specifications in Event-B [15], a semantical map between these specifications and 
Event-B language should be established. Fig. 1 below defines the relation between primitive protocol components 
and Event-B constructs. Once we have the protocol stack embedded in Event-B, its correctness is established by 
proof obligations for the invariants, where each event, including the initialization event, should preserve these 
invariants. Event-B guards are used to define preconditions that should hold before the event can be executed. The 
guard and the action of an event define a relation between variables before the event holds and after. Proof 
obligations are produced from events in order to state that the invariant condition is preserved. These proof 
obligations need to be verified in order to proof the correctness of the invariants. ZigBee devices and nodes are 
defined as constants, functions and operations are defined as events, similarly, layers interfaces are modeled as 
events. Once an event is executed, the set of connected nodes that forms a network is updated accordingly. Each 
layer of ZigBee protocol stack is modeled in Event-B machine along with its attributes, then, interfaces between 
layers is modeled using events. Finally, properties related to the correct operation of the protocol are modeled as 
Event-B invariants. Rodin framework [5] is used to check the consistency of these properties with regards to the 
Event-B model as shown in Fig. 1.   
To create the Event-B model for the protocol, we use the same layered approach, where machines are used to 
model layers and interfaces between these layers are defined with events. The abstract model of the protocol defines 
its basic components and its initial states. Proof obligations for invariants are generated from the abstract model in 
the initial state, in addition, certain properties about the correctness of the protocol are defined for the concrete 
model as invariants, and another set of proof obligations are generated for these invariants from the concrete model. 
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Event-B abstract model can be refined with events 
or variables. We use events to model different layers 
primitives. In the refined model, we use similar 
events to model the updates on the abstract one. The 
correctness of the protocol properties, modeled by 
the invariants with regards to the event-B concrete 
model is achieved through the correctness of the 
gluing invariant over the two models. In the 
following section, we show how ZigBee protocol 
stack components and its properties are embedded in 
Event-B.   
4. Embedding and Verification of ZigBee 
Protocol Stack in Event-B  
The ZigBee stack architecture is made up of a set 
of layers that performs services for the layer above. 
Layers have a data entity that provides a data 
transmission service and a management entity that provides all other services. Each service entity exposes an 
interface to the upper layer through a service access point (SAP), and each SAP supports a number of service 
primitives to achieve the required functionality [6].  
4.1. ZigBee Protocol Stack  
The ZigBee stack architecture includes three layered components: Medium Access Control (MAC) layer, 
Physical layer, and the ZigBee Network layer. Each component provides an application with its own set of services 
and capabilities. The services are provided by two entities: the data entity and the management. Each provides its 
services through its own service access point. The network layer includes two service entities that provide the 
necessary functionality to interface with the application layer. These entities are the network layer data entity 
(NLDE) and the network layer management entity (NLME). Each provides data services via its associated SAP [6]. 
4.2.  Data and Management Entities  
We model the network layer data entity primitives Event-B by providing en embedding in Rodin [5] platform. 
NLDE-DATA.request primitive requests the transfer of a data PDU from the local APS sub-layer entity to a single 
or multiple peer APS sub-layer entities. NLDE-DATA.confirm reports the results of a request to transfer a data PDU 
from a local APS sub-layer entity to a single peer APS sub-layer entity. Finally, NLDE-DATA.indication indicates 
the transfer of a data PDU from the network layer to the local APS sub-layer entity.  
ZigBee devices can perform the following functions: join a network, leave a network, rejoin a network. Both 
ZigBee coordinators and routers can permit devices to join or leave the network, assign logical network addresses, 
and maintain a list of neighboring devices. Only ZigBee coordinators can establish a new network.  
CONTEXT C0 
SETS 
NLDE    Network layer data entity primitives type 
NLDE_STATUS_NLDE  Request status message used in con_rm 
DEVICES    ZigBee Devices 
CONSTANTS 
NLDE_DATA_REQ    NLDE_DATA_CONF  NLDE_DATA_IND  
INVALID_REQUEST  MAX_FRM_COUNTER  NO_KEY 
NODES    ROUTERS   COORDINATORS 
AXIOMS 
axm1 : NLDE_DATA_REQ אNLDE  רNLDE_DATA_CONF א   NLDE 
axm2 : NLDE_DATA_IND א NLDE  רINVALID_REQUEST א NLDE_STATUS  
axm3 : MAX_FRM_COUNTER  אNLDE STATUS 
axm11 : NODES  كDEVICES  רROUTERS  ؿDEVICES  רCOORDINATORS   ؿDEVICES 
axm15 : NODES  ŀ  (ROUTERS  ׫ COORDINATORS)  ൌ  ׎   ROUTERS  רCOORDINATORS  ൌ ׎    
END 
Fig. 1. Event-B Embedding and Verification of ZigBee Protocol Layers 
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Data entity is modeled above, where the first part defines three sets, the NLDE primitive type to identify the 
commands used in the interface within the protocol, status messages, NLDE_STATUS and finally, a set of possible 
devices, which can be regular nodes, routers, coordinators, etc. In the second part, all possible NLDE primitives, 
status messages, and devices are defined. These components are bound to their sets through a number of axioms, the 
last two axioms are used to model the restrictions on the above sets. Similarly, network layer management entity and 
primitives are modeled in Event-B: 
CONTEXT C1 EXTENDS C0 
SETS 
NLME   NLME_STATUS 
CONSTANTS 
NLME_NWK_FORM_REQ  NLME_NWK_FORM_CONF  NLME_JOIN_REQ  SUCCESS 
NLME_JOIN_IND   NLME_JOIN_CONF   INVALID_REQ STAR_UP  FAILURE 
AXIOMS 
axm02 : NLME_NWK_FORM_REQ א NLME  ר NLME_NWK_FORM_CONF א  NLME 
axm10 : NLME_JOIN_REQ  א  NLME ר NLME_JOIN_IND  א  NLME 
axm32 : FAILURE  א NLME_STATUS  ר  SUCCESS  א  NLME_STATUS  רINVALID_REQ  א NLME_STATUS 
END 
CONTEXT C2 EXTENDS C1 
SETS 
MLME 
CONSTANTS 
MLME_SCAN_REQ  MLME_SCAN_CONF  MLME_SET_CONF  MLME_SET_REQ 
MLME_START_REQ  MLME_START_CONF  node1  node2 coord router 
AXIOMS 
axm01 : MLME_SCAN_REQ א MLME  רMLME_SCAN_CONF  אMLME 
axm04 : node1 אNODES רnode2 אNODES  רrouter אROUTERS רcoord  אCOORDINATORS 
END 
The functional requirements are modeled in Event-B by providing a set of events, where each event checks for 
the validity of the service for the initiating device. 
4.3.  Layers Services and Interfaces 
We define the basic machine including the initialization event, and then we define the services provided by the 
layers interfaces in a refined machine. The following ZigBee operations are embedded in Event-B: 
Initialization event. In the initialization event, attributes for various devices are set to their default values as 
described in the protocol specifications. The network is assumed to be empty, which means it is not formed yet, 
coordinators are the only devices that are granted permission to establish a network. We define a function 
nwkCapable that maps a device into a boolean value that represents its capability of creating network. This value 
might change, for instance when a coordinator creates a network. In addition, another function called Parent is 
defined below, this function is used to pair nodes with routers or coordinators so that nodes can join the network 
through them. The initialization event is defined below:  
MACHINE M0  
SEES C2 
VARIABLES 
nwkCapable  NETWORK  NLMEcmd   MLMEcmd  NLME_status  Parent 
INVARIANTS 
inv11 : NETWORK  كDEVICES  ר  NLMEcmd   אNLME   ר MLMEcmd   א MLME  ר  nwkCapable אDEVICES  → BOOL 
inv14 : NLME_status  אNLME STATUS  ר  Parent  א  {COORDINATORS  ׫ ROUTERS  െ  NODES} 
EVENTS 
Initialisation 
begin 
act1 : node1nwkCapable ؔ FALSE 
act4 : coordnwkCapable  ؔ TRUE 
act5 : routernwkCapable ؔ  FALSE 
act6 : NETWORK ؔ   ׎ 
act7 : Parent ؔ {coord հ node1}  ׫ሼrouter հ node2} 
act8 : nwkCapable ؔ  {node1 հ  FALSE; node2 հ FAL_SE; coord  հ TRUE; router  հFALSE} 
end 
END 
Establishing a new network. The procedure to successfully start a new network is illustrated in the message 
sequence chart shown in Fig 2 [6] as given in ZigBee specifications. When a request to establish a new network is 
initiated through use of the NLME-NWK-FORMATION.request primitive, the Event-B confirms that the device has 
the appropriate nwkCapable value, and not currently joined to a network. This operation is defined using the 
following guarded event: 
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Event FormReq   
any  dev 
when 
grd5 : dev  א COORDINATORS ר  nwkCapable(dev)  ൌ TRUE 
grd1 : NLMEcmd ൌ NLME_NWK_FORM_REQ 
grd4 : NETWORK  ൌ׎  רMLME status  ൌ PERMITED 
then 
act1 : MLMEcmd ؔ  MLME_SCAN_REQ 
act2 : NLME_status ؔ  SUCCESS 
act3 : NETWORK ؔ  NETWORK  ׫ሼcoord} 
act11 : NLMEcmd ؔ  NLME_NWK_FORM_CONF 
act12 : nwkCapable(dev) ؔ  FALSE 
end 
END 
Joining a Network. The procedure for permitting devices to join a network is initiated through the NLMEPERMIT- 
JOINING.request primitive. Only devices that are either the ZigBee coordinator or a ZigBee router shall attempt to 
permit devices to join the network. We consider joining a network through association case, other cases are modeled 
similarly. In addition other events such as leaving a network, resetting devices, and network discovery are also 
defined similarly. This operation is defined using the following guarded event: 
Event Join   
any 
dev  status  devP 
where 
grd1 : dev  NODES 
grd2 : devP   ROUTERS  devP COORDINATORS 
grd4 : devP NETWORK dev NETWORK 
grd6 : status  ൌ  PERMITTED רParent(devP) ൌ dev 
then 
act1 : NETWORK ؔ NETWORK  ׫ሼdev} 
act2 : NLME_status ؔ SUCCESS  
end 
END 
4.4. 4.4. Protocol Properties 
The three kinds of nodes in a ZigBee network are coordinators, routers and end device which are the sensor 
nodes. When ZigBee creates the network, there are some basic rules that should apply in order to maintain the 
operation of the network. These rules are modeled as Event-B invariants and must hold for the protocol to be 
correct. Each generates a number of proof obligations in Rodin, these proof obligations are proven one by one, some 
are automatically discharged using the proof system of the tool, and some must be proven interactively by providing 
certain rewrite rules to simplify the obligation.  
In the following, we state four properties for illustration purposes. These properties are defined for the machine 
M0, and verified for the events of this machine. The first property states that the end devices should connect through 
a router or a coordinator, this property is modeled in Event-B using the following invariant: 
Prop. 1  ∀d,n • d אሺROUTERS ׫CORDINATORS)רn אNODES רn א NETWORK ֜ Parent(d)= n 
The next property states that a coordinator cannot establish a network if it has already established one, and is 
modeled in Event-B using the following invariant: 
Prop. 2  ∀d • d אሺCORDINATORS d  NETWORK)֜ nwkCapable(d)ൌ FALSE 
A similar property states that routers and end devices cannot establish network and is modeled using the 
following invariant: 
Prop. 3 ∀d • d אDEVICES רd אሺROUTERS ׫ NODES)֜ nwkCapable(d)ൌFALSE 
The last property states that any node cannot join an empty network. It is included in machine M0 above that 
executes the join event. It is modeled as follows: 
Prop. 4 ∀n • n אሺNODES ר NETWORK) ֜ NLME_status ൌ FAILURE 
These properties are all defined as invariants in Rodin platform, the tool generates proof obligations which were 
successfully discharged using Event-B proof control. The results achieved here are important because our method 
allows modeling the protocol structure at different levels of abstraction. This model can be further refined in order to 
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include more details about the protocol implementation, while preserving the correctness of the invariants. In 
addition, the verification of any extension of the protocol will be straight forward by a refinement of this model. 
This is useful for future work on verification of the protocol while operating within the WSN environment. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we provide a formal verification method for ZigBee protocol stack. We use Event-B to model the 
protocol layers and their interfaces, and Event-B invariants to model and verify certain properties for the protocol. 
For this purpose, a formal link between the semantics of the protocol model and Event-B was established. Even 
though the ZigBee protocol stack has received considerable attention of analysis and testing using simulation, we 
believe that formal methods can provide certain level of assurance about the correctness of the protocol that 
simulation based methods cannot. The approach we present here is based on first-order theorem proving, and 
therefore, it overcomes the limitations of current methods. In addition it provides functional verification of the 
ZigBee protocol stack at different levels of abstraction. 
The rich expressive language of the first-order logic allows us to formally verify complex properties about the 
protocol. As future work, an extension of the current layered model to handle a more refined description of the 
protocol will allow the verification of a concrete implementation of the protocol. In addition, modeling and verifying 
liveness properties about the ZigBee protocol will add more assurance about its correct design. It will also be 
interesting to investigate modeling certain features of the protocol operation environment and how it affects its 
functionality. 
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